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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the role played by the IMF in eight recent sovereign debt 
restructurings from a comparative perspective: Argentina (2001-2005), the Dominican 
Republic (2004-2005), Ecuador (1999-2000), Pakistan (1998-2001), the Russian Federation 
(1998-2001), Serbia (2000-2004), Ukraine (1998-2000) and Uruguay (2004). Our objective is 
to identify the various dimensions of the IMF’s potential involvement during those processes, 
and to extract some relevant policy implications to reform the Policy of Lending Into Arrears. 
We find that the IMF can potentially exert a substantial influence on sovereign debt 
restructurings by influencing countries’ decision to restructure when the debt burden is 
deemed unsustainable, by providing official finance to substitute for a loss of access to 
international financial markets, by setting a medium-term domestic adjustment path through 
conditionality, by providing ‘independent’ information at a time of heightened uncertainty, 
and by providing incentives both to creditors and debtors. However, a lack of consistency 
has tended to characterize the role of the IMF in recent sovereign debt restructurings. 
In part, this reflects the flexibility with which the IMF has adapted its intervention 
to country-specific factors. However, we argue that this lack of consistency has tended to 
exacerbate the uncertainty and information asymmetries that are often associated with 
sovereign debt restructurings, and that a more systematic approach is needed. 
 
JEL codes: E65, F34, H63. 
Keywords: IMF, Sovereign Debt, Restructurings, Default, Solvency. 
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1 Introduction 
The issue of sovereign debt restructurings has long figured prominently in the international 
policy agenda. The beginning of the present decade witnessed an intense debate on whether 
the international community should adopt a statutory approach centred on the establishment 
of an official debt restructuring mechanism to address sovereign insolvencies. Ultimately, this 
proposal was dropped in favour of a less ambitious contractual approach based on the 
inclusion of collective action clauses and other innovations in international bond issuances. 
Apart from committing the Institution to promote collective action clauses, this approach left 
the role of the IMF in coping with sovereign debt restructurings essentially unchanged. 
The IMF’s toolkit does not include any instrument specifically designed to deal with 
sovereign debt restructurings. This has provided the IMF with some flexibility to react to 
specific circumstances on a case by case basis, which has come at the cost of somewhat 
exacerbating the uncertainty that surrounds the official response to such disruptive episodes 
in international financial markets. In most cases, the IMF’s involvement in debt restructurings 
has been articulated around a financial program approved either prior to the sovereign’s 
restructuring plan, or as a result of it. Formally, there is no distinction between such programs 
and “traditional” IMF-supported programs. Only if a country falls into arrears with its external 
private creditors, as it is often the case during sovereign debt restructurings, does the policy 
of Lending Into Arrears (LIA) come into effect. This is why the LIA policy is often associated 
with the role of the IMF in sovereign debt restructurings. However, it is important to note that 
there is scope both for debt restructurings backed by an IMF program without activating the 
LIA policy (in the case of “pre-emptive” restructurings in which the sovereign remains current 
on its external debt payments) and for programs under the LIA policy in which only minor 
components of sovereign debt are re-negotiated in order to settle pending arrears. 
The LIA policy has been included as one of the specific items for revision under the 
IMF’s ongoing medium-term strategic review. One of the reasons why the LIA policy has 
come under closer scrutiny in recent years is the broad-based discontent with the role played 
by the Fund during the Argentine debt restructuring (2001-2005). Indeed, this episode raised 
awareness about a number of shortcomings and ambiguities of the LIA policy, among which 
the following stand out in particular: (i) the Fund’s financial exposure to the country that 
launches a restructuring tends to generate a conflict of interest for the Institution, and hence 
reduces its credibility as an impartial/independent player in the crisis resolution process; (ii) 
the good faith criterion, which conditions the Fund’s financial support under the LIA policy, is 
fundamentally devoid of economic content and judgemental in nature, which leaves scope for 
arbitrariness in its interpretation; (iii) some have argued that, in order not to interfere with the 
negotiations between the sovereign debtor and its private creditors, the IMF should restrain 
from providing the “resource envelope” of the restructuring through its program’s 
macroeconomic framework. Others, instead, argue that this is a key feature of the public 
good provided by the IMF during a restructuring process; (iv) intimately linked to the above is 
the ambiguity stemming from the Fund’s role as a provider of information and the question of 
whether the Institution should systematically provide the parties involved in the restructuring 
with a debt sustainability analysis. 
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This paper is aimed at providing food for thought for the upcoming discussion on the 
review of the LIA policy. It departs from Díaz-Cassou, Erce and Vázquez (2008), a companion 
paper which comprehensively analyzes 9 sovereign debt restructurings: Argentina, Belize, the 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Pakistan, Russia, Serbia, Ukraine and Uruguay. Here we try to 
identify the various dimensions of the Fund’s involvement in those processes. We focus on 
the eight cases in which an IMF-supported program was in place in the period surrounding 
the restructuring and, therefore, we drop the case of Belize from our analysis. Not in all of the 
cases covered in this paper was the LIA policy formally applied. However, we have extended 
our analysis beyond proper LIA cases for considering that, whenever a program was in place 
during the restructuring, the IMF was facing comparable policy challenges. Our idea, 
therefore, is that non-LIA programs in place during a restructuring can be informative and 
provide meaningful insights for the design of the LIA policy itself. 
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the main 
features of the IMF’s Policy of Lending Into Arrears. In section 3 we present a comparative 
analysis of the case studies covered in Díaz-Cassou et al. (2008). We concentrate especially 
on the comparison between pre-emptive and post-default cases, on the degree of 
comprehensiveness of the various restructurings, and on the discriminatory treatment given to 
the different categories of domestic and external creditors. Section 4 concentrates more 
specifically on the role played by the IMF in the debt restructurings. Finally, section 5 
concludes and presents some policy implications. 
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2 The Policy of Lending Into Arrears 
Up until 1989 the IMF stuck to a policy of non-toleration of arrears to private creditors, 
meaning that all financial programs required the elimination of arrears and the 
non-accumulation of new arrears during the program period. This policy was seen as 
instrumental to provide both members states and private creditors with the incentives to seek 
a timely agreement in order to clear arrears and, potentially, to restructure debt. The 
protraction of the 1980’s debt crisis, however, gradually undermined the rationale behind the 
non-toleration of arrears. Indeed, mainly as a result of the development of a secondary market 
for banks’ claims and of the strengthening of commercial banks’ balance sheets, private 
creditors showed increasing reluctance to engage in constructive negotiations with their 
sovereign debtors. In this context, the non-toleration of arrears began to be seen as a de 
facto veto power assigned to commercial banks over the Fund’s lending decisions.  
The policy of lending into arrears, therefore, was introduced in 1989 as an explicit 
move to reduce private creditors’ leverage over the Fund’s decision to provide financial 
support to crisis countries as well as the ensuing use of that leverage in their direct 
negotiations with sovereign debtors. The new policy basically legalised the Fund’s lending to 
countries in arrears to commercial banks, subject to the existence of a discernible negotiation 
process ongoing between the sovereign and its private creditors. It also allowed for a further 
accumulation of arrears during the program period. This paved the way for a more active IMF 
involvement in the resolution of the debt crisis, and has remained ever since a pillar of the 
Fund’s role in sovereign debt restructurings.  
There have been various modifications of the LIA policy since its inception. In 1998, 
the policy was broadened to encompass bonded debt reflecting the changing composition of 
international capital flows and, more precisely, the securitization of sovereign debt. One year 
later, the policy was modified again to soften the requirements that negotiations be in place in 
order for a Fund supported program to be approved. Under the new policy, formal 
negotiations are not required to have begun as long as the member state is deemed to be 
making a good faith effort to reach a collaborative agreement with its creditors. This change 
was basically aimed at reflecting that, given the heterogeneity and number of bondholders 
potentially involved, initiating negotiations for the restructuring of bonded debt is likely to be 
much more difficult than for syndicated loans. A last modification was introduced in 2002 with 
the introduction of various principles aimed at providing some guidance for the interpretation 
of the good faith criterion. 
Having reviewed its origins and subsequent modifications, the specific features that 
characterize the LIA policy remain to be identified. As we have seen, in essence the LIA policy 
constitutes a legal device to allow the Fund’s lending in a set of circumstances in which 
financial programs were ruled out in the past. There are basically two procedural elements 
that differentiate a LIA program from a ‘traditional’ program: 
o The inclusion of the good faith criterion as an additional condition for the Fund’s 
disbursements. As mentioned above, this criterion was introduced without a clear 
definition. This called for a subsequent issuance of some principles to assess 
whether a member is undertaking efforts to reach a collaborative agreement with 
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its private creditors: (i) the member should engage in an early dialogue with 
creditors, (ii) the member should share relevant information on a timely basis1, 
(iii) the member should provide creditors with an early opportunity to give input on 
the design of restructuring strategies and the design of individual instruments. 
Notwithstanding this clarification, the good faith criterion is still perceived as 
ambiguous and its assessment remains fundamentally judgemental. 
 
o While arrears remain outstanding, financing assurances reviews shall be 
conducted prior to the disbursement made available after the approval of 
the arrangement. Such reviews are aimed at determining whether adequate 
safeguards are in place for the further use of the Fund’s resources, and to assess 
whether the member’s adjustment efforts are undermined by developments in 
debtor-creditors relations. 
 
Beyond these procedural requirements, the LIA policy does not really specify what 
the role of the IMF should be during a sovereign debt restructuring. It has often been 
argued that the provision of official financial support may mitigate the economic dislocation 
caused by the restructuring, thereby contributing to preserve the economic value of creditors’ 
claims and facilitating the normalization of the member’s external financial position. In this 
sense, some have established a parallelism between LIA programs and debtor-in-possession 
financing in private bankruptcies. There are, however, a number of channels through which 
the IMF can potentially influence the outcome of a restructuring that go well beyond the mere 
provision of financial support. First of all, just as any IMF-supported program, LIA programs 
are constructed upon a macroeconomic framework which includes conditionality over 
domestic adjustment. If domestic adjustment is interpreted as the counterpart of the “haircut” 
imposed on creditors as a result of the debt restructuring, the program’s macroeconomic 
framework unavoidably influences the negotiation process. In addition, the IMF can play an 
important role as a provider of information. This can be particularly important during a 
restructuring given the heightened uncertainty that tends to surround such episodes. Finally, 
the IMF can play an active role in a restructuring, for instance if it influences the sovereign’s 
decision to restructure in the first place, if it takes part in meetings with private creditors or if it  
issues comfort letters to support participation in the exchange. 
Not specifying ex ante these dimensions of the Fund’s involvement in debt restructurings 
has provided the Institution with flexibility to adapt to the specific circumstances of each case. The 
Argentine case, however, tends to put this scheme into question. This paper’s departing 
hypothesis is that the ongoing strategic review may constitute a window of opportunity to go 
beyond the current procedural approach of the LIA policy, providing it with a clearer economic 
content to effectively guide the IMF in the various dimensions of its potential role during debt 
restructurings.
                                                                          
1. This includes an explanation of the economic problems and financial circumstances justifying the debt restructuring, a 
briefing on the broad outlines of a viable economic program to address the underlying problems and its implications 
on the broad financial parameters shaping the envelope of resources available for restructured claims, and the 
provision of a comprehensive picture of the proposed treatment of all claims, including those of official bilateral creditors, 
and the elaboration of the basis on which the debt restructuring would restore medium-term sustainability, bearing in 
mind that not all categories of claims may need to be restructured. 
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3 Case studies 
We cover 8 sovereign debt restructurings: Argentina, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Pakistan, 
Russia, Serbia, Ukraine and Uruguay. Boxes 1 and 2 briefly put these debt restructurings in 
context. The IMF was involved in all of these cases through a financial program approved 
either prior, during and/or after the restructuring. As mentioned above, some of these 
countries broadly remained current in the service of their external private debt, implying that 
the LIA policy did not always come into effect. In addition, we have excluded from our 
analysis cases in which the LIA policy was (or ought to have been) applied as a result of minor 
external arrears which did not give rise to a broad-based restructuring of sovereign debt. In 
our view, although relevant for the design of the LIA policy, these cases raise issues clearly 
differentiated from the sovereign debt restructurings scenarios analyzed here, which we have 
left for further consideration. Our analysis revolves around four key factors which we consider 
relevant for a re-framing of the LIA policy. Firstly, we carry out a comparison between pre-
emptive restructurings and post-default restructurings. In the second place, we try to 
distinguish cases in which the restructuring was comprehensive from those in which the 
authorities adopted a selective approach. Thirdly, we address the issue of domestic creditors 
and of whether these were treated differently from external creditors at the various stages of 
the crises. Finally, we focus on the role played by the IMF in the 8 restructurings analyzed.  
3.1 Pre-emptive vs. post-default restructurings 
A basic differentiation between the restructurings analyzed here is whether these 
were pre-emptive in nature, or were instead carried out following a sovereign default. 
In principle, pre-emptive restructurings could be assumed to have been aimed at addressing 
liquidity problems, while post-default restructurings tend to be associated with situations 
of insolvency, which is why the debt to GDP ratio at the time of the restructurings tends to be 
higher in the post-default cases. According to this line of reasoning, the LIA policy should be 
expected to have been applied in the post-default restructurings. However, reflecting the 
complicated dynamics of debt restructurings, this association is not always straightforward. 
Both types of restructurings were, in general, preceded by large rises in the level of external 
debt. Indeed, as shown in table 1, regarding the liquidity-solvency dichotomy, the situation of 
some of the preventive and post-default restructurings was ambiguous. In the preventive 
cases, this would be so for Pakistan and Uruguay, where the debt to GDP ratios stood at 
84% and 103% respectively at the time the restructurings were launched. In the post-default 
cases, the debt to GDP ratios of Russia and Serbia stood at significantly lower levels: 52% 
and 64% respectively2. The liquidity indicators confirm this ambiguity, given that both 
Pakistan and Uruguay displayed a higher debt service to exports ratio than Russia, while the 
total debt service to reserves ratio was higher in the Dominican Republic, Pakistan and 
Uruguay than in all of our post-default cases. In addition, as a result of minor arrears with 
specific suppliers or commercial banks, the LIA policy was applied to some pre-emptive 
cases, such as the Dominican Republic. Given that neither the sustainability of the debt stock 
nor the intensity of liquidity pressures suffice to explain the authorities’ choice to remain 
current on debt payments during the restructurings, other factors must be at play. To a large 
extent, the decision to default was circumstantial and highly influenced by country specific 
political or social factors or by the authorities’ capacity to deal with the economic dislocation 
caused by a crisis. This was clearly the case in Serbia where most of the arrears were 
                                                                          
2. We have considered Serbia a case of insolvency given the volume of arrears accumulated during the 90´s, and the 
state of economic dislocation after the war. 
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accumulated during the conflict years, or in Argentina, where the default was announced 
following the fall of the elected government, partly in order to signal a change in the course 
of economic policies and to calm social unrest. In Ecuador, the default was a by-product of 
institutional weaknesses and especially fiscal rigidities, which constrained the authorities’ 
ability to stabilize the economy and to formulate an effective crisis resolution package. In 
Russia, the default was part of broader emergency measures passed after the Parliament 
(Duma) derailed a stabilization package which could have resumed disbursements under the 
IMF’s supported program. 
Box 1: Pre-emptive restructurings 
Dominican Republic: primarily as a result of the mishandling of a banking and currency 
crisis, the Dominican authorities began experiencing important liquidity pressures in 2003. 
This led the government to request a treatment from the Paris Club, which was signed in April 
2004. In order to seek comparability of treatment by private creditors, a plan to restructure 
bonded and commercial debt was announced later that year. By June 2005, the bonds’ 
exchange had been completed, and an agreement with the London Club was reached in 
October 2005. This smooth restructuring was facilitated by the cooperative stance of the 
authorities, the low “haircuts” involved, and the fact that, in spite of the accumulation of 
relatively minor arrears, the servicing of external debt was never interrupted. 
 Pakistan: stemming from the fall in exports and net official inflows that resulted from a 
deteriorating international environment in Asia and from the imposition of international 
sanctions, Pakistan experienced a severe liquidity crisis in 1998 and 1999. In spite of some 
arrears accumulated with official lenders, Pakistan remained broadly current on its external 
obligations. An agreement reached with the Paris Club in January 1999 to reschedule close 
to US$3.25 billion paved the way for the resolution of the Pakistani crisis. In order to comply 
with the comparability of treatment clause, a further agreement was reached with the London 
Club in July 1999 and Pakistan completed a successful restructuring of its outstanding 
Eurobonds in November of that same year.     
Ukraine: contagion from the Russian crisis, the ensuing depreciation of the currency and a decline 
in economic activity triggered increasing difficulties to roll-over incoming debt obligations in 1998, 
forcing the government to carry out a series of debt restructurings. Initially, a selective approach 
was adopted as the authorities restructured specific debt instruments (domestic and foreign 
currency bonds, and a Chase-Manhattan loan) between August 1998 and August 1999. Although 
contributing to alleviate short-term liquidity pressures, these partial restructurings simply postponed 
the problem and large repayment obligations were concentrated in years 2000 and 2001. As a 
result, in February 2000 the government launched a comprehensive restructuring, involving 
external bonds with a face value of close to US$3.3 billion. Eventually, 99% of creditors 
participated in the exchange, accepting an average haircut estimated at 32%. Completing the debt 
restructuring, an agreement was reached with the Paris Club in 2001 to treat bilateral debt 
amounting to about US$580 million.   
Uruguay:  after years of economic stagnation compounded by a banking crisis resulting from 
large deposit withdrawals first by Argentines and then by residents, Uruguay was forced to 
float its currency in June 2002. This caused a large depreciation of the peso which, together 
with the fiscal cost of the banking crisis, led to a sharp increase in the debt to GDP ratio 
pushing the country to the brink of default. With the support of the IMF, on March 2003 the 
authorities announced their intention to carry out a market-friendly debt restructuring to 
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moderate short-term liquidity pressures and improve the medium-term servicing profile of 
foreign currency denominated sovereign debt. Eventually, although a debt exchange was 
successfully settled on May 2003, several observers questioned whether the associated debt 
relief was sufficient to secure the sustainability of Uruguay’s debt.  
 
Another factor that may influence the authorities’ choice is that remaining current on 
debt payments tends to facilitate the restructuring. Table 1 shows that pre-emptive 
restructuring were quicker to complete: 4 quarters on average against 7 quarters in the 
post-default cases. In addition, it would seem that the countries that restructured 
pre-emptively managed, on average, to secure a higher creditor participation in the debt 
exchange than in the post-default scenario: 97% against 88%.  
 
Box 2: Post-default restructurings 
Argentina: after several quarters of economic stagnation resulting mainly from a combination 
of external shocks, loose fiscal policy, structural rigidities and a progressive deterioration in 
the country’s perceived creditworthiness, in December 2001 the Argentine government 
defaulted on its sovereign debt. This set the stage for the largest debt restructuring in 
recent history, which has been characterized by its complex, protracted and contentious 
nature. It took close to 21 months for the authorities to present a first restructuring offer, and 
the debt exchange could not be opened until February 2005, more than three years after the 
default. Even after the completion of the exchange, holdout creditors’ claims remain to be 
settled, and an agreement with bilateral official creditors has not yet been reached.   
Ecuador: a banking collapse, domestic institutional weaknesses, loose macroeconomic policies 
and a succession of exogenous shocks combined in the late 1990’s to trigger a severe financial 
crisis in Ecuador. As a result, in October 1999 Ecuador became the first country ever to default 
on its Brady bonds, and a few months later the sucre was dropped in favour of the dollar as the 
national legal tender. Throughout year 2000, a comprehensive debt restructuring was carried 
out, including Brady and Eurobonds as well as official bilateral loans through the Paris Club. 
By May 2001 arrears had been completely cleared, with close to 97% of eligible bondholders 
having accepted the substantial losses included in the terms of the restructuring.   
Russia: following the rejection of a comprehensive fiscal adjustment by the Duma, in August 
1998 Russia shocked the international financial community by devaluating its currency, 
defaulting on its rouble denominated debt and imposing a 90-days moratorium on private 
sector repayments on external creditors. Although the government made a first restructuring 
offer as early as August 25 of that same year, no exchange offer could be launched until 
March 1999 (the so-called Novation scheme) partly because of the lack of a credible 
domestic adjustment program to back the government’s proposal. Throughout this process, 
Russia serviced external debt issued after 1992, while accumulating substantial arrears on 
Soviet-era debt. No agreement to restructure bilateral official debt could be reached until 
August 1999 given that no on-track IMF program (a pre-condition for a Paris Club treatment) 
was in place until the month of July of that same year. A third component of the Russian debt 
restructuring was the London Club agreement signed in August 2000. 
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Serbia & Montenegro:  at the turn of the century, the Yugoslav debt to GDP ratio was close 
to 145% of GDP. Given that external debt servicing had been interrupted during the military 
conflicts of the 1990’s, more than 80% of that debt was in arrears to private and public 
creditors, including multilateral organizations. The overthrow of the Milosevic regime and other 
important political changes in the second half of year 2000 paved the way for the 
normalization of Serbia’s external relations: international sanctions were lifted, arrears to the 
World Bank and the IMF were cleared, and the membership of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia to both institutions was resumed. Following the approval of an IMF-supported 
program, an agreement was reached with the Paris Club in November 2001, treating close to 
37% of external debt. Negotiations with the London Club and other commercial creditors, 
however, were much more protracted, and no settlement could be agreed until July 2004 
after which most Serbian arrears were cleared. These successive restructurings brought the 
Serbian debt to GDP ratio down to about 60%. 
 
However, it is worth noting that these results are clearly biased by the Argentine case 
which, as mentioned above, was especially protracted and contentious. The clearest 
incentive to restructure pre-emptively, instead, may lie in the objective of recovering access 
to international financial markets. Indeed, all of the indicators used in table 1 suggest that the 
countries that remained current on external debt payments managed to tap international 
financial markets more quickly than defaulters. This is especially clear for the Dominican 
Republic and Uruguay, and less so for Ukraine and Pakistan which, in any case, had limited 
access to international financial markets also prior to the restructuring. Among the 
post-default cases, Russia was the country which recovered access to international financial 
markets quicker. This may be so because the Russian government defaulted on securities 
issued domestically while remaining current on post-soviet debt issued abroad. 
On the other hand, table 1 shows that “haircuts” measured in NPV terms were much 
larger in post-default restructurings than in the pre-emptive cases: on average 41.8% against 
19.2%. Furthermore, the share of debt affected by the restructuring both to GDP and to total 
debt was also higher in the post-default cases, implying that the extent of debt relief was 
significantly larger for defaulters. This may be so because the act of defaulting tends to alter 
the bargaining power of private creditors and the sovereign debtor in favour of the latter. 
Indeed, in pre-emptive cases the liquidity relief is felt only after the debt exchange has been 
completed but not during the negotiation phase. Instead, in post default cases the completion 
of the debt exchange has the opposite effect given that it usually coincides with the 
resumption of debt servicing. Indeed, as illustrated especially by the Argentine case, every 
month of delay in the settlement of a default can generate substantial savings in foregone 
interest payments. As a result, defaulters may have a financial incentive to delay the 
agreement and search for harsher restructuring terms, while non-defaulters’ best interest lies 
in reaching a quick agreement, which tends to come at the expense of a larger debt relief. 
The shift in bargaining power from the debtors to the creditor entailed by the act of 
defaulting is illustrated in Chart 1. The various restructurings analyzed in this paper are 
ordered according to the authorities’ degree of coerciveness for which we use the index 
developed by Enderlein et al. (2007). As we can see, the most coercive debt restructurings 
analyzed here do clearly correspond to the post-default ones. In that respect, a comparison 
between the debt restructurings of Argentina and Uruguay is particularly illustrative: while the 
former took all its time to launch the debt exchange and impose large losses on bondholders, 
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the latter emphasized the market-friendly nature of its restructuring, securing a fast settlement 
with moderate losses for investors. 
It would seem, therefore, that the decision to default or to remain current on debt 
obligations has a strategic component and may be associated with the existence of a trade-
off between greater debt relief or a quicker access to international financial markets. 
Ultimately, it is difficult to determine which category of restructurings had a better outcome. If 
the restoration of debt sustainability is taken as the main parameter to assess the outcomes 
of the restructurings, our case studies yield ambiguous results. Indeed, the two cases in 
which debt sustainability was more questioned following the restructuring were Argentina and 
Uruguay, which constitute to some extent the epitomes of our post-default and pre-emptive 
cases. The comparison of the evolution of post-restructuring GDP growth in pre-emptive and 
post-default cases also yields inconclusive results.     
                                                                          
 
Table 1: Key features of pre-emptive VS post-default cases 
 
e
 
 
                                                 
Source: Own calculations based on GDF, WDI, IADB, and IMF.  
1 Closest available data to the launching of the exchange 
2 From the authorities’ announcement of the re-structuring plan to the official closure of the exchange. 
3 From the default to the official closure of the exchange.  
4  Calculations only over total external debt. 
 
 
Nature of the problem. Debt affected by restructuring Debt Exchange Access to int’l capital markets. 
Liquidity 
Country
Debt/GDP1 Debt
service
/Xs
TDS to 
reserves
Liquidity VS 
Solvency
Total     
($US 
million) 
% of 
GDP
% of total 
debt
Duration
(quarters)
2,3
NPV
loss 
Particip.
(%)
1st int’l 
bond
issuance
(3 month 
periods)
EMBI
level at 
last
issuance
EMBI
level
below
1000 
p.b
Pre-
emptive
DR 56% 0.08 3.53 Liquidity 1628 10% 17.5% 5 1 97 8 5 2.5 
Pakistan 84% 0.22 1.41 Ambiguous 19041 31% 61%4 12 30 99 21 - 12 
Ukraine 42% 0.07 0.57 Liquidity 4689 9% 53%4 7 32 99 17 - 13 
Uruguay 103% 0.40 4.20 Ambiguous 5300 43% 42% 1 14 93 3 7 1 
Average 71.25% 0.19 2.42  7664.5 23.2% 43.3% 4 19.2 96.8 12.25 6 7.1 
Post-
default
Argentina 130% 0.30 0.65 Solvency 82000 30% 56% 13 73 76 20 14 14 
Ecuador 101% 0.35 1.19 Solvency 7475 45% 44.5% 4 26 97 24 - 16.5 
Russia 52% 0.07 0.39 Ambiguous 40113 24% 39*4 4 48 92 13 15 11 
Serbia 64% n.a. n.a. Solvency 7124 n.a. n.a. - 62 - Not yet - - 
Average 86.75% 0.24 0.74  34178 33% 47% 7 41.8 88.3 19 14.5 10.3 
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Chart 1: Degree of coerciveness of pre-emptive vs. post-default restructurings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2 Partial vs. comprehensive debt restructurings 
Another important distinction is whether the sovereign adopted a partial or a comprehensive 
debt restructuring strategy. Under the first approach, the sovereign focalized the restructuring 
in more or less specific debt instruments. Presumably, this tended to be the case when 
liquidity pressures were mostly generated by these specific debt instruments, or when the 
sovereign tried to ring-fence certain categories of debt in order to limit the disruption caused 
by the restructuring. The sovereign opted for a more comprehensive approach if the main 
categories of debt were involved in the restructuring (with the exception of multilateral 
obligations given the preferred creditor status of the IMF and other international financial 
institutions). Presumably, this tended to occur when liquidity pressures were so widespread 
that the restoration of debt sustainability required the involvement of most creditors in the 
restructuring, or when the sovereign tried to preserve some level of ‘fairness’, inter-creditor 
equity and thereby a market friendly approach. 
Most of the case studies covered here have featured some degree of selectiveness 
at some point of the debt restructuring process. During the early stages of the debt crisis, this 
selective approach was particularly discernible in Argentina and Russia. In both cases, the 
authorities tried to alleviate short-term liquidity pressures through voluntary debt exchanges: 
the so-called June 2001 mega-swap in Argentina, and the July 1998 exchange of ruble 
denominated debt for Eurobonds in Russia. Eventually, both attempts not only failed to 
prevent the crisis and avoid a broader restructuring of debt or a default, but were 
counter-productive. Indeed, although the Argentine US$29.5 billion mega-swap involved a 
debt relief of about US$15 billion for the period 2001-2005, it increased debt repayments 
after 2006 by as much as US$65 billion, further pushing the Argentine economy into 
insolvency. In turn, the low participation in the Russian debt exchange (US$4.4 billion of a 
total eligible debt of US$41 billion) is considered to have acted as a wake up call, fuelling 
investors’ concerns and further feeding upward pressures on spreads. Both the cases of 
Argentina and Russia, therefore, illustrate the risk posed by financial engineering operations 
designed to bridge short-term liquidity pressures in times of heightened vulnerability. 
After these failed attempts to bridge liquidity pressures, the authorities of both 
countries were forced to broaden the scope of their restructuring. Russia, however, managed 
to stick to a selective approach and limited the default to domestically issued bonds while 
remaining current on most internationally issued debt, with the exception of external 
obligations inherited from the Soviet Union. In Argentina, the authorities tried to discriminate 
between various categories of creditors by phasing the restructuring: in phase I debt held by 
residents was exchanged for loans, and a phase II was contemplated to restructure debt held 
by non residents. Eventually, however, Argentina defaulted soon after completing phase I, 
and the restructuring was disorderly broadened to encompass most of its sovereign debt, 
Argentina, 2005 Global Bond Restructuring (Post-default)
Russia, 1998-1999 Domestic Restructuring (Post-default)
Ecuador, 2000 Bond Restructuring (Post-default)
Argentina, 2001 Domestic Restructuring (Pre-emptive)
Russia, 1998-1999 Foreign Restructuring (Post-default)
Pakistan, 1999 Bonded Debt Restructuring (Pre-emptive)
Dominican Republic, 2005 Bonded Debt Restructuring (Pre-emptive)
Ukraine, 2000, Comprehensive Restructuring (Pre-emptive)
Ukraine 1999, ING & Merryl Lynch debt workouts (Pre-emptive)
Argentina, 2001 Mega-swap (Pre-emptive)
Uruguay, 2003 Bond Exchange (Pre-emptive)
Source: Henrik Enderlein, L Muller & C. Trebesh (2007)
Degree of coerciveness
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reducing the government’s room for manoeuvre to discriminate between categories of 
creditors. 
At the outset of their respective debt crises, Ecuador and Ukraine also tried to limit the 
scope of their restructurings to specific categories of debt. Originally, Ecuador suspended coupon 
payments only on its PDI and Discount Brady bonds and tried to persuade investors to limit the 
restructuring to that type of debt. Eventually, however, Ecuador also defaulted on its Eurobonds 
and was forced to carry out a comprehensive restructuring which involved some categories of 
domestic and bilateral official debt. In Ukraine, as mentioned above, the authorities carried out a 
wave of selective restructurings during 1998 and 1999 involving specific domestic and foreign 
bonds as well as loans. This, however, simply postponed the problem and Ukraine was forced to 
launch a comprehensive restructuring of its international bonds as early as February 2000. 
A very specific scenario arises when the authorities’ most immediate concern is to 
restructure bilateral official debt. In such circumstances, an agreement with the Paris Club 
tends to be sought in the first place. One of the conditions attached to Paris Club 
arrangements is the so-called comparability of treatment clause, which commits the 
sovereign to secure debt relief from private creditors on a similar scale as that granted 
previously by official creditors. As a result, the scope for a selective approach is reduced, and 
the authorities are forced to involve private creditors even when liquidity pressures are likely to 
have been sufficiently addressed with the Paris Club treatment. The Dominican Republic, 
Pakistan and Serbia can be said to be in this scenario. While in the Dominican Republic the 
amount of bonded debt eventually involved in the restructuring significantly exceeded the 
volume of the Paris Club treatment, in Pakistan private external debt was marginal, and its 
restructuring had a minor impact in terms of the restoration of debt sustainability (see Chart 
2). In Serbia, the Paris Club treatment was part of a broader effort to normalize the country’s 
external relations after the end of the war, which required a substantial debt relief in order to 
clear existing arrears. In this sense, the Paris Club agreement paved the way for negotiations 
with private creditors, and for the London Club agreement which was eventually reached in 
2004. 
Not all of the restructurings studied here have involved the Paris Club. In Uruguay, no 
treatment was agreed presumably because the authorities opted not to call in the Paris Club 
given that bilateral official debt was such a minor component of sovereign debt at the time of 
the restructuring. In Argentina, no comprehensive agreement with bilateral creditors could be 
reached. After the early cancellation of the IMF-supported program, this has been partly due 
to the fact that one of the key pre-conditions for a Paris Club treatment was no longer met. 
However, prior to that, other obstacles must have prevailed given that, although IMF 
programs were in place from January 2003 to August 2004, the opportunity to reach an 
agreement with the Paris Club which was not seized. Conversely, Ecuador and Ukraine 
signed a Paris Club treatment after having completed their respective private debt 
restructurings. Indeed, Ecuador signed an agreement with the Paris Club in September 2000, 
a few weeks after the official closure of the private debt exchange. In Ukraine, the Paris Club 
agreement was signed in July 2001, months after the completion of the private debt 
restructuring. In any case, our case studies shows that the comparability of treatment 
principle is not necessarily reciprocal: only if the Paris Club acts as the first mover in the 
restructuring is the sovereign committed to seek comparable treatment from private and 
official creditors. As a result, the timing of the Paris Club involvement may be strategic: 
sovereigns may have an incentive to postpone treatments in order to retain their ability to 
discriminate among investors and types of debt.  
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Chart 2: Debt restructurings’ burden sharing3 4
     Domestic
     Bilateral (Paris Club)
     International bonds
     Commercial (London Club)
                                                                         
3. Multilateral debt is excluded. 
4. This graph does not reflect NPV losses assumed by each category of creditors. As a result, it does not fully capture 
the burden sharing of the restructurings. However, it gives an idea about the comprehensiveness of the respective 
restructurings. 
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Not all of the restructurings studied here have involved the Paris Club. In Uruguay, no 
treatment was agreed presumably because the authorities opted not to call in the Paris Club 
given that bilateral official debt was such a minor component of sovereign debt at the time of 
the restructuring. In Argentina, no comprehensive agreement with bilateral creditors could be 
reached. After the early cancellation of the IMF-supported program, this has been partly due 
to the fact that one of the key pre-conditions for a Paris Club treatment was no longer met. 
However, prior to that, other obstacles must have prevailed given that, although IMF 
programs were in place from January 2003 to August 2004, the opportunity to reach an 
agreement with the Paris Club which was not seized. Conversely, Ecuador and Ukraine 
signed a Paris Club treatment after having completed their respective private debt 
restructurings. Indeed, Ecuador signed an agreement with the Paris Club in September 2000, 
a few weeks after the official closure of the private debt exchange. In Ukraine, the Paris Club 
agreement was signed in July 2001, months after the completion of the private debt 
restructuring. In any case, our case studies shows that the comparability of treatment 
principle is not necessarily reciprocal: only if the Paris Club acts as the first mover in the 
restructuring is the sovereign committed to seek comparable treatment from private and 
official creditors. As a result, the timing of the Paris Club involvement may be strategic: 
sovereigns may have an incentive to postpone treatments in order to retain their ability to 
discriminate among investors and types of debt.  
Uruguay stands out in particular as being a case in which the authorities went at 
great length to preserve a market-friendly approach during the restructuring process. To 
some extent, this was aimed at differentiating the Uruguayan debt restructuring from the 
disorderly Argentine default. One of the manifestations of this market friendly approach was 
the absence of discriminatory practices between types of creditors. Indeed, from the outset 
Uruguay involved most of its non-multilateral sovereign debt and, as shown in Chart 2, 
creditors shared the burden of the restructuring quite proportionally to the ex ante structure of 
sovereign debt, which tends to signal a rather comprehensive approach. However, even in 
that case official bilateral debt and international loans were spared from the restructuring, 
presumably because both categories of debt were relatively minor components of total debt. 
Chart 2 compares the ex ante structure of sovereign debt at the outset of the 
restructuring with the relative weight of the various types of debt ultimately involved in the 
restructuring, and the ex post structure of sovereign debt. In principle, those cases in which 
the relative weights of restructured debt are similar to the ex ante structure of sovereign debt 
should be associated with a comprehensive approach. Accordingly, the most comprehensive 
restructurings of our sample seem to have been the Serbian and Uruguayan cases. In spite of 
the selective approach described above, the Argentine debt restructuring, together with the 
Dominican one, can be labelled as intermediate cases in terms of their comprehensiveness. In 
turn, the restructurings in Ecuador, Pakistan, Russia and Ukraine seem to have been rather 
selective. In the case of Russia this was partly due to the weight of Soviet era debt in the 
restructuring, and to the fact that the default was limited to domestically issued debt. In 
Ecuador, Pakistan and Ukraine, the selectiveness in the restructuring arises mainly because, 
to varying extents, domestic creditors were spared from the restructuring.  
3.3  Domestic vs. external creditors 
Partly as a result of an increase in the share of sovereign debt held by residents in emerging 
markets, some recent restructurings have featured an extensive involvement of domestic 
creditors in the crisis resolution strategy. This was the case especially for Argentina, Russia 
and Uruguay, and less so for Ecuador and Ukraine. In the cases of the Dominican Republic, 
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Pakistan, Serbia and Ukraine, domestic debt was either a minor component of sovereign 
debt, or was mostly spared from the restructuring. In addition, it is worth noting that financial 
globalization makes it increasingly difficult to distinguish between domestic and external debt 
given that the opening up of the capital account enables residents to hold debt issued by their 
sovereign in foreign jurisdictions, and foreign investors to acquire claims issued domestically. 
In this context, the jurisdiction of issuance seems to be losing relevance as an indicator of 
creditors’ nationality.   
In any case, domestic debt instruments and domestic creditors have certain specific 
features that deserve special attention. First of all, resident creditors are by definition subject 
to the domestic legal and regulatory framework, implying that the sovereign has more tools at 
its disposal to encourage or even coerce into their participation in a debt exchange. 
Furthermore, this “jurisdictional” feature implies that litigation tends to be less disruptive for 
the sovereign when involving domestic creditors in a debt restructuring. Second, if the 
sovereign remains current on its external obligations while defaulting or imposing a 
restructuring on domestic debt, it might retain some degree of access to international financial 
markets, especially if investors believe in the authorities’ commitment and capacity to 
discriminate between types of debt. Third, the restructuring of debt held by residents has 
a direct impact on the domestic economy, adding up to the burden already caused by 
the adjustment process taking place as a result of the crisis. Furthermore, a large portion 
of the sovereign debt held domestically is often in the hands of banks or other institutional 
investors such as pension funds (especially in countries that have reformed their pension 
systems from PAYG to fully funded systems). As a result, the restructuring of domestic debt 
can have a very negative impact on the solvency of the domestic financial system: on the 
asset side the “haircut” associated with the restructuring constitutes a direct loss for financial 
institutions, while on the liability side the restructuring of sovereign debt can trigger 
a confidence loss and potentially large scale deposit withdrawals. Finally, political economy 
considerations may also be at play, given that domestic creditors are more likely to influence 
the sovereign’s decision making process than external ones. 
Box 3: discrimination between domestic and foreign creditors 
Argentina: during the pre-default phase of the Argentine crisis, as access to international 
financial markets was gradually lost, the authorities resorted to a variety of increasingly 
heavy-handed measures to mobilize domestic sources of finance. These included the exertion 
of moral suasion on domestic investors to absorb sovereign debt (the Patriotic bond), financial 
engineering operations to relieve short-term liquidity pressures at the expense of increasing 
the long-term burden of debt (the mega-swap) or the November 2001 exchange of domestic 
debt for guaranteed loans supposedly collateralized with revenues from the financial 
transaction tax. As a result, the ratio of debt held by residents to total sovereign debt rose 
from 33% to 41% in 2000 and 2001.The December 2001 default, instead, was originally 
targeted at foreign creditors, given that by that time most Argentine residents had 
supposedly exchanged their bonds for guaranteed loans, which were excluded from the 
default. When the government pesified these loans, however, many residents swapped 
them back for the original bonds in default. Some did so voluntarily, exerting a right that 
was included in the November debt exchange, while others (mainly pension funds) were 
forced to swap back guaranteed loans for not accepting the terms of the pesoization. 
Ultimately, the authorities granted a special treatment (lower haircut) to domestic pension 
funds in recognition of their coerced absorption of sovereign debt in late 2001. 
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Ecuador: the share of domestic to total sovereign debt at the time of the restructuring was 
close to 16%. As part of its default, Ecuador suspended servicing domestic obligations 
maturing between September 1999 and end-2000 involving debt with a face value of 
approximately US$346 million (close to 15% of total domestic debt). During the restructuring 
process, the government clearly differentiated between domestic and external creditors, 
offering residents much more lenient terms. Indeed, according to the IMF, the exchange of 
domestic debt for a new bond was effectively equivalent to a roll-over aimed primarily at 
alleviating liquidity pressures, and carrying practically no NPV loss. 
Russia: as opposed to other cases analyzed here, rather than mobilizing domestic sources of 
finance to substitute for a loss of access to international financial markets, during the months 
leading to the August default, the Russian authorities were substituting ruble-denominated 
bonds for lower-yielding debt issued abroad. This was motivated by the short-term maturity 
profile of domestically issued bonds, which were absorbing the bulk of the upward pressures 
on yields. In addition, Russia enjoyed access to international financial markets up until a late 
stage of the crisis partly because it was perceived as being “too big” or “too nuclear” 
to fall, thereby creating expectations for an international bailout should the need arise. 
The restructuring of the Russian bonded debt had a clear domestic bias. Indeed, on August 
1998 Russia defaulted solely on domestically issued bonds, 70% of which was estimated to 
be in the hands of residents. This is explained first and foremost by the aforementioned 
fact that the domestic bond market was generating most of the liquidity pressures 
undergone by the authorities. However, another motivation is likely to have been that of 
avoiding international litigation, and exploiting a “jurisdictional” advantage in the restructuring 
negotiations. Foreign creditors involved in the restructuring, however, were forced to deposit 
proceeds in restricted non-interest ruble accounts, and were faced with 5-years repatriation 
restrictions. This added substantial losses on the haircut already imposed by the 
restructuring, thereby moderating the aforementioned domestic bias. Ultimately, the bulk of 
holdout creditors (paid in full but subject to repatriation restrictions) were non-residents. 
Ukraine: In the case of Ukraine most of the restructured debt was held by external creditors. 
However, some of the domestic T-bills restructured in 1998 were in the hands of both 
domestic banks and international investors. The terms of the restructuring were milder 
for domestic investors (around 7%) than for foreign ones (40%). During the second 
restructuring, in order to respect inter-creditor equity, Ukraine was in technical default for a 
brief period. 
 
These features of domestic debt pose significant trade-offs for the authorities and 
may have a bearing on the restructuring strategy ultimately chosen. Indeed, the 
aforementioned factors create incentives for the sovereign to discriminate between resident 
and non-resident creditors. On the one hand, if the sovereign is experiencing important 
liquidity pressures, it may opt to exhaust all potential domestic sources of finance in an 
attempt to remain current on its external obligations or to substitute for the loss of access to 
international financial markets. In the most extreme cases, this may entail a more or less 
forced restructuring of domestic sovereign debt. Under this scenario, the cost of that 
restructuring for the domestic economy is presumably deemed lesser than that of losing 
access to international financial markets and facing disruptive litigation from external 
creditors. On the other hand, the sovereign may focus on limiting the direct impact of the 
restructuring on the domestic economy and/or keeping the financial system afloat. Under this 
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scenario, the authorities may opt to discriminate against external creditors, for instance by 
offering softer restructuring terms to domestic creditors or by excluding certain categories of 
domestic creditors from the restructuring. 
We find instances of both types of discrimination in the case studies covered here. 
The most relevant experiences are highlighted in Box 3. In Ecuador and Ukraine, the terms 
of the restructuring were worse for non-residents, presumably in order to mitigate the 
impact of the restructuring on the domestic economy. In the cases of Argentina and Russia, 
however, the direction of this discrimination is ambiguous. In Argentina, during the pre-default 
phase of the crisis, the authorities went at great length to involve domestic creditors and 
eventually carried out a semi-coercive restructuring of debt held by residents which has often 
been equated to a domestic default. In this way, the sovereign gambled for resurrection in an 
attempt to save the convertibility regime and to avoid external default. Once that strategy 
failed, the authorities focused the restructuring on external debt, although a substantial 
number of residents were ultimately also involved in the default. In Russia, the government 
defaulted on domestically issued debt while remaining current on post-Soviet debt issued 
abroad. This was primarily due to the fact that liquidity pressures stemmed mainly from 
the domestic market, although the objectives of avoiding international litigation and 
mitigating the loss of access to international financial markets are also likely to have played 
a role. The non-residents that were caught in the restructuring of GKOs and OFZs, however, 
suffered worse terms, given that on top of the restructuring, they faced capital controls 
restricting the repatriation of cash proceeds. 
Although our evidence is limited, some patterns seem to emerge as regards the 
involvement of domestic creditors in sovereign debt restructurings. The cases of Argentina 
and Russia suggest that prior to an external default domestic investors are more likely to be 
coerced into further accumulating sovereign debt or accepting some debt relief in order 
to provide the sovereign with breathing space to service external debt. However, once the 
sovereign has defaulted on foreign debt, as occurred in Argentina and Ecuador, 
non-residents tend to bear the restructuring’s burden in order to soften the impact of the 
crisis on the domestic economy. The state of the financial sector is likely to play a role in 
this sequencing. Indeed, the Argentine banking sector was perceived to be in a relatively 
good footing prior to the default, which may have led to an underestimation of the risks 
associated with further increasing banks’ holdings of sovereign debt. Instead, in Ecuador and 
some of the other cases of our sample such as the Dominican Republic, the banking crises 
originated the crisis, which probably encouraged the authorities to limit domestic banks’ 
involvement in the restructuring. In Russia, a low level of financial intermediation together with 
the public ownership of the main banks (and the ensuing implicit sovereign guarantee on 
deposits) may have reduced the perceived impact of the restructuring on the economy, 
thereby explaining its domestic bias. 
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4 The role of the IMF 
The IMF was involved in all of our case studies through a financial program. Yet, as shown in 
Appendixes 1 and 2, the size, conditions and timing of these programs vary from case to 
case, with important implications for the role ultimately played by the Fund in the respective 
sovereign debt restructurings. A first relevant distinction between the cases under 
consideration is whether the LIA policy was effectively applied. As we can see in Appendix 1, 
arrears with external private creditors co-existed with IMF supported programs in the cases of 
Argentina, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Russia, Serbia and Ukraine5. However, 
program-related documents do rarely specify whether the LIA policy was activated in these 
cases neither at the time of the approval of the program, nor at subsequent reviews. 
Furthermore, the fulfilment of the procedural requirements of the LIA policy (financing 
assurances reviews and good faith criterion) does not seem to have been always 
systematically assessed, at least in the cases of Ecuador, Russia and Ukraine. Even when 
program-related documents refer to these procedural requirements, the assessment of their 
fulfilment is brief and unarticulated. As a result, these programs do not differ substantially from 
‘traditional’ ones, which tends to blur the specificities of the LIA policy.  
Regarding the starting point of the Fund’s program involvement in debt 
restructurings, two broad groups of countries can be identified: 
o Countries with inherited programs: the IMF had been continuously involved in 
Argentina, Pakistan, Russia and Ukraine for several years prior to the crisis and the 
launching of the restructuring. In Pakistan and Ukraine, this program involvement 
was uninterrupted throughout the restructuring in spite of relatively short periods in 
which the programs went off-track. The Fund’s involvement in Argentina and 
Russia was much more complex. Indeed, both programs went off-track just prior 
to the default, and remained so during important phases of the restructuring. In the 
case of Argentina, a new transitory program was approved in January 2003, later 
to be succeeded by a three years SBA signed in September of that same year. 
Eventually, however, that program was suspended in August 2004. Various factors 
contributed to the suspension of the Argentine program such as the limited 
progress with the program’s structural agenda or the authorities’ lack of progress 
with the restructuring. Another factor behind the suspension was the authorities’ 
willingness to avoid the IMF program to interfere with the negotiation process with 
bondholders going on at that time. In Russia, a new 17-months SBA was signed in 
July 1999, once the novation scheme had already been completed. Russia 
made only one purchase under that arrangement, partly as a result of considerable 
slippages in the program’s structural benchmarks. In 2000, after having served 
as a stepping-stone for the Paris Club treatment, that program was cancelled.  
 
o Countries with new programs: in the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Serbia and 
Uruguay no IMF program was in place prior to the eruption of the crisis. This is 
clearer in Ecuador and Serbia, where the programs were approved only after 
their defaults had been consummated. Instead, in the Dominican Republic and 
                                                                          
5. Instead, Uruguay was a purely pre-emptive case in which the sovereign fully honoured its external obligations 
during the period under consideration, while in Pakistan some arrears were accumulated with official external creditors, 
implying that the LIA policy was never triggered. 
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Uruguay, the IMF stepped in to respond to unfolding financial crises but prior to 
the announcement of the debt restructurings. A first SBA was approved for the 
Dominican Republic in August 2003. Although this program served as the basis for 
the Paris Club treatment, only the first review could be completed before the 
program went off-track. Instead, the new 28-months SBA approved in January 
2005 was implemented successfully. As for Uruguay, a first precautionary 
arrangement was signed on May 2000 in order to shield that country from the risk 
of contagion from Argentina and Brazil. Eventually, as the situation deteriorated, 
Uruguay was forced to use the resources committed by the Fund, and a new 
much larger program was approved on May 2002. Following two augmentations, 
that program became the largest in the history of the IMF if measured with respect 
to the size of the recipient economy.    
 
This distinction between ‘inherited’ and ‘new’ programs is not trivial. Indeed, the presence of 
inherited programs implies that, prior to the eruption of the debt problem the IMF was already 
financially exposed to the countries which undertook the restructuring. Unless total fund’s 
exposure increases, augmentations of existing programs or programs approved during the 
restructuring in order to succeed the inherited ones, do not provide fresh resources and, at 
least partially, do simply roll-over existing obligations to the Fund. This tends to undermine the 
debtor-in-possession argument as a justification for the policy of Lending Into Arrears. 
Furthermore, it may create a conflict of interest for the IMF, which may come to be perceived 
as primarily concerned with safeguarding its resources and preserving its preferred creditor 
status. In turn, this tends to undermine the Fund’s legitimacy as an independent actor 
charged with providing a public good aimed at improving the outcome of the restructuring 
and limiting its impact on international prosperity. This conflict of interests tends to be 
accentuated in the case of large inherited programs where the Fund may fear the 
consequences of an extension of the default to multilateral obligations. This was the case of 
Argentina, which contributes to explain why the involvement of the Fund in that restructuring 
turned out to be so contentious.  
In any case, there are a number of dimensions of the Fund’s involvement in 
sovereign debt restructurings that go beyond the mere provision of financial assistance. A first 
relevant question is whether the IMF exerted any discernible influence on the sovereigns’ 
decision to default or restructure. This is not easy to tell given that, for obvious reasons, the 
discussions between the Fund and its members on such sensitive issues are not made 
public. In addition, it is the IMF’s firm policy not to interfere with members’ contractual 
obligations. However, in some cases many observers believe the Fund to have played a 
significant role in the decision making process that resulted in the launching of the 
restructuring. This would be the case of Ecuador, Ukraine and Uruguay, in the first case to 
address a clearly unsustainable situation6, and in the latter cases to fill residual financing 
needs under the Fund supported programs. In Argentina and Russia, the Fund did also play a 
role in the decision to default, albeit an indirect one. Indeed, in both cases after having lost 
access to international financial markets, the suspension of the Fund’s financial support dried 
up the last available significant source of foreign exchange to continue honouring sovereign 
debt. A third scenario arises when the Paris Club opens the restructuring process, as was the 
case for the Dominican Republic, Pakistan and Serbia. Under this scenario, the IMF is 
involved in the first place as a pre-requisite for obtaining the Paris Club treatment, and private 
                                                                          
6. Stanley Fisher acknowledged in May 2000 having discussed with Ecuador the pros and cons of a default of, “pointing 
out the risks of disruptive legal challenges in case of a default and the difficulties of sustaining a viable cash position in 
case of staying current on debt obligations”. 
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creditors are involved later in fulfilment of the comparability of treatment clause. Although it is 
difficult to argue that the Fund influenced the decision to renegotiate debt, it is clear that it 
played a pivotal role in this well established restructuring framework. 
A second crucial dimension of the Fund’s involvement in debt workouts is the setting 
of the resource envelope of the restructuring. This relates to the macroeconomic framework 
and conditionality embedded in Fund supported programs approved to support a 
restructuring. The Fund’s role as an adjustment agent is undisputed in ‘traditional’ IMF 
programs. During a restructuring, however, the level of domestic adjustment associated with 
the Fund’s conditionality is unavoidably linked to the relief or haircut that is necessary from 
private creditors in order to restore debt sustainability. As a result, it is likely that the 
establishment by the Fund of an adjustment path influences the negotiation between the 
sovereign debtor and its private creditors. 
In most of the case studies analyzed here, the IMF has continued to play the role of 
an adjustment agent through the programs approved in the context of a restructuring. This 
was particularly clear when the Paris Club was involved early on, again as part of the well 
institutionalized restructuring framework described above. Although the Paris Club was only 
involved at a later stage of the restructuring, or not involved at all, this also tended to be the 
case for Ecuador, Ukraine and Uruguay. Conversely, the Fund played at best a minor role in 
setting the resource envelope of the Argentine and Russian restructurings. In the latter case, 
the IMF programs were off-track when the novation scheme was carried out and when an 
agreement was reached with the London Club in August 2000. Instead, an on-track program 
was in place when official bilateral debt was restructured in August 1999. In Argentina, in turn, 
the program’s conditionality was deliberately set in soft and short-term oriented terms: the 
September 2003 SBA established a floor on the primary surplus of 3% of GDP while fiscal 
targets for 2005 and 2006 were not even specified. Furthermore, the program was 
suspended in August 2004. As a result, domestic adjustment was entirely left to be 
determined by the bargaining process between the government and its creditors. In this 
dimension of the Fund’s involvement, the inherited character of the program was crucial given 
that, at least to some extent, the Fund was held hostage by the Argentine threat of defaulting 
on its multilateral obligations, while private creditors were far from viewing the institution as an 
independent or uninterested part in the restructuring process. 
Intimately linked to the above is the Fund’s role as a provider of information. This 
third potential dimension of the Fund’s involvement is particularly relevant in the context of 
sovereign debt restructurings given the heightened uncertainty and informational asymmetries 
that tend to characterize such episodes. No consistent approach seems to have 
characterized the Fund’s involvement in that respect. Indeed, there are substantial variations 
in the amount of information disclosed by the Fund in the various cases under consideration. 
This is probably due to the fact that member states have the right to preclude the Fund from 
disclosing certain market sensitive pieces of information. As a result, the informational role of 
the Fund tends to be more intense in ‘market-friendly’ restructurings. For instance, the Fund 
published most program-related documents in the cases of the Dominican Republic or 
Uruguay. Instead, few documents were published in the cases of Argentina and Ecuador. 
Although references to debt sustainability are relatively frequent in program-related 
documents, no fully-fledged debt sustainability analysis was provided by the IMF in most of 
the cases under consideration.  
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A fourth dimension of the Fund’s involvement in sovereign debt restructurings is the 
provision of incentives to the parts involved in the process. The Fund has various instruments 
to provide such incentives. A central one is the good faith clause. Indeed, by conditioning the 
Fund’s financial support to the authorities’ good faith, that clause is aimed at creating 
incentives to adopt a collaborative stance in the debt workout. However, in spite of the 2002 
attempt to clarify its content, assessing compliance with the good faith criterion is 
fundamentally judgemental and sometimes arbitrary. This is especially illustrated by the 
Argentine case, where the Fund’s program was not suspended on the basis of a breach of 
the good faith clause even if most observers believe that, rather than engaging in a 
constructive dialogue, the authorities simply presented a series of take or leave it offers clearly 
detrimental to creditors’ interests. As a result, at least in its current form, the good faith clause 
has lost much of its credibility as an enforceable obligation attached to the Fund’s lending into 
arrears. 
Additionally, the Fund has often tried to coordinate creditors by encouraging 
participation in the debt exchange. This usually takes the form of a comfort letter issued by 
the IMF’s managing director to the members of the financial community in support of the 
authorities’ economic program and the terms of the restructuring. In some cases, the Fund 
has gone beyond the mere provision of its seal of approval. This was especially the case for 
Uruguay, where the Managing Director made it clear that an insufficient participation in the 
debt exchange could lead to a suspension of the Fund’s financial support and, thereby, to a 
much higher likelihood of a sovereign default. Indeed, the Comfort letter issued on April 22, 
2003 specified that “(…) achieving these objectives is a condition for completion of the next 
(third) review under Uruguay's stand-by arrangement. A successful debt exchange requires 
high participation to allow the program to go forward and the forthcoming review to be 
completed”.      
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5 Conclusions and Policy Implications 
One of the main conclusions that can be extracted from our case studies is the lack of 
consistency that has tended to characterize the involvement of the IMF in recent sovereign 
debt restructurings. Indeed, we have discerned several country specific factors shaping the 
Fund’s approach to most of the dimensions of the restructuring processes analyzed above7. 
A first question to be raised is whether the IMF should preserve this case by case approach, 
or whether it should adopt a more systematic framework to shape its involvement in countries 
that are renegotiating sovereign debt. The current case by case approach has had the 
advantage of providing the Fund with some degree of flexibility to adapt to a changing world 
and to customize its crisis resolution strategies to potentially very different types of debt 
crises. However, this lack of consistency tends to exacerbate the uncertainty and 
informational asymmetries that are often associated with sovereign debt restructurings, and 
provides fertile ground for criticism by creating the perception that creditors or debtors are 
treated unequally depending on the specific circumstances that surround each crisis. The 
international community, therefore, needs to decide whether the IMF should play a more 
standardized role in sovereign debt restructurings and, if so, in what dimensions and through 
which instruments. 
An important obstacle to frame the Fund’s role in debt restructurings is the lack of a 
policy or instrument designed specifically for that purpose. This paper has focused on the 
policy of lending into arrears given that, more often than not, the Fund’s programs in place 
during a restructuring are implemented under that policy. However, there are significant 
exceptions in the context of purely pre-emptive restructurings such as Uruguay’s, or when 
arrears arise only with official or domestic creditors, as was the case in Pakistan. In any case, 
even the LIA policy fails to specify the role that the IMF is to play during sovereign 
restructurings8. Indeed, rather than a policy in the broad sense of the term, it simply 
constitutes a device to legalize the Fund’s lending in a very specific scenario, introducing 
loose procedural requirements which are absent in ‘traditional’ programs. A second question, 
therefore, is whether the current procedural approach ought to be maintained or whether, 
instead, the LIA policy should be endowed with a meaningful economic rationale. By that we 
mean specifying the role to be played by the IMF in a number of specific dimensions in such a 
way as to contribute to improve the outcome of sovereign debt restructurings. 
As argued above, a first dimension is the role of the IMF in the decision making 
process that leads to the launching of the restructuring. The articles of agreement establish 
that a crucial element of the Fund’s mandate is to provide members with “opportunities to 
correct maladjustments in their balance of payments without resorting to measures 
destructive of national or international prosperity”. Accordingly, the IMF’s firm policy is to 
avoid interfering with members’ contractual obligations. However, when a country’s debt 
position becomes unsustainable, the IMF may have a role to play in advising country 
authorities on the best course of action to minimize the cost of an unavoidable restructuring 
on domestic and international prosperity. In this respect, our case studies suggest that, as 
                                                                          
7. Part of this lack of consistency is due to the fact that some of the case studies covered here date prior to the 
clarification of the LIA ‘good faith criterion’ in 2002, and the introduction of DSAs in 2002 and 2003. However, even after 
these dates, our case studies have identified a number of inconsistencies. 
8. In addition, the Fund’s LIA policy also applies to the case of minor arrears which may not require a broad-based debt 
restructuring. This paper has deliberately left this scenario out of its focus. 
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debt problems mount, countries have a tendency to gamble for redemption by applying 
partial measures in order to bridge short-term liquidity pressures. Such measures are often 
detrimental in the medium to longer term, either by simply delaying the resolution of the crisis, 
by increasing the burden of long-term debt, or by pushing the domestic financial system to 
the brink of insolvency. The IMF, therefore, should avoid supporting measures such as the 
Argentine mega swap or the Russian pre-default debt swap. On occasions, this may entail 
advising countries to adopt a comprehensive approach to restore debt sustainability at an 
early stage of the crisis, which may even require advising to restructure.  
The second potential dimension of the Fund’s involvement is the provision of the 
‘resource envelope’ of the restructuring through the macroeconomic framework and 
conditionality embedded in its programs. Some observers have argued that the Fund should 
restrain from fulfilling that function in order not to interfere with the negotiations between the 
sovereign and its creditors. The proponents of that view consider that asking the IMF to set 
the resource envelope of the debt workout constitutes an interventionist practice inconsistent 
with the market-based approach adopted by the international community to handle sovereign 
restructurings. Should deterministic macroeconomic frameworks be dropped from LIA 
programs, the Fund would be effectively abandoning its role as an adjustment agent in a very 
particular set of circumstances. Given that this role is undisputed in ‘traditional’ programs, the 
question is whether the presence of external arrears or an ongoing restructuring process 
justifies restricting the scope and functions of IMF-supported programs.  
Our case studies suggest that sovereign debt restructurings tend to be smoother 
when the Fund retains its role as an adjustment agent. This is particularly clear in the 
restructurings which involved the Paris Club at an early stage, which may be the result of the 
specific features of a well institutionalized framework, a clear division of labour within the 
official sector, and the effectiveness of the comparability of treatment clause. In turn, the most 
disruptive and contentious restructurings analyzed here have been precisely those in which 
the IMF did not act as an adjustment agent, i.e. the Argentine and the Russian cases. There is 
some evidence to argue, therefore, that the provision of a macroeconomic framework to 
anchor expectations does effectively promote a constructive dialogue between the sovereign 
and its creditors. Indeed, this may be a crucial component of the public good provided by the 
Fund in a distressed debt situation particularly prone to market failures. In any case, this is 
one of the dimensions of the Fund’s involvement in which consistency is most needed, given 
that a case by case approach equates to an unequal treatment of members in terms of the 
conditions demanded from them to access the Fund’s financial support. 
In addition, the definition of a macroeconomic adjustment path under an
IMF-supported program is not necessarily detrimental of debtor/creditor negotiations. This is 
so because IMF programs define a resource envelope only in the short-term (one to three years). 
The debt relief resulting from the negotiations between creditors and debtors, instead, 
depends on a much longer adjustment path. Consequently, even if the IMF agrees with its 
members on an adjustment path over the time horizon of a program, there is still room for the 
negotiations with creditors to yield very different results in terms of debt relief.    
The third potential dimension is the informational role of the IMF. As argued above, 
the amount of information disclosed by the Fund during sovereign debt restructurings has 
varied substantially from case to case. What is perhaps more surprising is that the format and 
scope of debt sustainability analyses included in published IMF documents has also exhibited 
substantial variations. In fact, the IMF has generally restrained from systematically disclosing 
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full-fledged debt sustainability analyses (DSAs) of countries engaged in a debt restructuring.  
A possibility to systematize the informational role of the Fund during sovereign debt 
restructurings could be precisely that of requiring the institution to provide a DSA to the parts 
involved. In recognition of the specificities posed by a sovereign debt restructuring This may 
conflict with the Fund’s transparency policy, under which publication of the DSA is voluntary 
and a prerogative of the member. However, the very specific scenario posed by sovereign 
debt restructuring processes could constitute an exception to that rule, and countries could 
be required to accept the divulgation of their DSA as one of the proofs of their ‘good faith’ 
when engaged in a LIA program. 
 A relevant question is whether such DSAs produced by the Fund would have a 
comparative advantage over DSAs produced by the private sector. In principle, the main 
source of this comparative advantage would stem from the independence that can be 
attributed to the Fund. In addition, especially in the absence of ‘inherited’ programs, the Fund 
should be expected to be better positioned than the private sector to access confidential 
information given its special relationship with its members. Finally, information has some of 
the features of a public good, implying that the private sector is likely to devote a sub-optimal 
volume of resources for its provision. This is especially the case in a world of securitized debt 
in which most individual bondholders are unlikely to have the resources and know-how to 
carry out a DSA.    
The fourth potential dimension of the Fund’s involvement is the provision of 
incentives to the parts engaged in the negotiations. The main instrument used by the Fund to 
fulfil that objective is the good faith criterion. This instrument, however, has exhibited 
important deficiencies, especially in the Argentine case. As a result, some observers have 
argued that it may be worth erasing that criterion from the LIA framework. This would require 
searching for alternative instruments to encourage constructive negotiations. A possibility, put 
forward recently by the Bank of England, could be the substitution of the good faith criterion 
by price incentives, i.e. introducing a surcharge on the cost of LIA programs. The argument 
goes that this would contribute to internalize the cost of delaying the restructuring process, 
thereby creating incentives for country authorities to engage early on in a constructive 
dialogue with private creditors. The problem, however, is that it may be difficult to legitimize 
this surcharge in a situation in which private creditors are being asked to absorb substantial 
losses in order to restore a country’s debt sustainability. In addition, especially in the case of 
‘inherited’ programs, adding such a surcharge in a distressed context may increase the risk of 
a default on multilateral obligations, thereby intensifying a potential challenge to the Fund’s 
preferred creditor status. 
Instead of eliminating the good faith criterion, another possibility could be to clarify 
that concept. This would require the introduction of objective and observable parameters to 
evaluate the sovereign’s good faith. It has been argued that the Principles for Stable Capital 
Flows and Fair Debt Restructurings could be used for that purpose. An obstacle, however, is 
that although the Fund broadly supported the initiative, it has shown reluctance to incorporate 
the principles in its own internal operative. This is partly due to a far from monolithic support 
on the part of emerging issuers, and to the perception that the principles may be somewhat 
biased in favour of private creditors’ interests. Moreover, there are some differences between 
current Fund’s policies and some aspects of the Principles such as the use of the creditor 
committees (see Progress Report on Crisis Resolution, SM/05/107). In any case, the 
principles could be used as a basis for developing more substantive guidance for the 
assessment of the good faith criterion. In particular, the IMF could focus on securing some 
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level of inter-creditor equity, trying to avoid unjustified discriminatory practices. This could be 
shaped along the lines of the Paris Club comparability of treatment clause, which has 
contributed to restrain discrimination and secure some level of equitable burden-sharing in 
past restructurings. As argued later, this framework would need to recognize the specificities 
of domestic creditors. 
Our case study analysis has revealed that the presence of ‘inherited’ programs can 
impair the Fund’s potential to play a substantive role in restructuring processes. Indeed, the 
Fund’s ex ante financial exposure to the countries that launch a restructuring has the potential 
to create a conflict of interests with implications for the four dimensions mentioned above. 
This conflict of interests increases with the size of the ‘inherited’ program. In fact, a modest ex 
ante financial exposure may even facilitate the ex-post involvement of the IMF by providing 
some degree of continuity to the program relation with the country concerned. However, as 
suggested by the Argentine case, if exceptionally large, inherited programs can invalidate the 
debtor-in-possession argument to justify the provision of official finance in the context of LIA 
programs, and jeopardize the Fund’s legitimacy vis-à-vis private creditors as an adjustment 
agent and provider of information and incentives. Given that it is very likely that ‘inherited’ 
programs will continue to be a fact of life in future debt restructurings, this issue should be 
taken on board in the upcoming review of the LIA policy. 
A possibility to mitigate this conflict of interests would be to automatically suspend 
‘inherited’ programs at the time of a sovereign default. The member would lose access to 
undisbursed resources, and would not be expected to make repurchases until the 
resumption of private debt servicing. After the default and suspension of the inherited 
program, the Fund could approve a new ‘interim’ program providing new resources under the 
LIA policy. Although the legal implications of such a framework would need to be discussed in 
great detail, it could have the following advantages. First of all, rather than simply rolling-over 
‘inherited’ obligations, LIA programs would be effectively providing ‘fresh’ resources to cope 
with the crisis and mitigate the economic dislocation caused by the restructuring. This would 
reinforce the debtor-in-possession justification for the Fund’s financial assistance to countries 
in default. Second, the Fund’s leverage would be likely to be reinforced under this framework. 
Indeed, the prospect of acceding additional IMF resources rather than simply rolling over 
existing obligations could realign countries’ incentives, making compliance with the programs’ 
conditionality (including the good faith criterion) likelier. In addition, this framework would 
reduce countries’ scope to threaten with defaulting on their multilateral obligations in order to 
press for the approval of successive program reviews during a sovereign debt restructuring.  
We consider that the introduction of a standstill on purchases and repurchases of 
‘inherited’ programs following a sovereign default would not substantially alter the seniority 
status of IMF loans because such obligations would never be made subject to a
re-negotiation process (as opposed to other official obligations such as Paris Club bilateral 
loans). The IMF may want to underline this point by introducing some sort of penalty charge 
proportional to the suspended repurchases (and maybe also to the duration of the program 
suspension) payable after the resumption of private debt servicing. In fact, by reinforcing the 
aforementioned debtor in possession rationale for LIA programs, such a scheme could even 
reinforce the legitimacy of the Fund’s preferred creditor status. It would also address one of 
the criticisms of the policy of lending into arrears in its current form: that rather than being 
targeted at mitigating the economic dislocation caused by the crisis, financial assistance 
following a sovereign default is mainly targeted at avoiding missed payments on IMF loans 
and, thereby, at defending the Fund’s own financial position. 
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We are aware that this reform, by committing the institution to provide fresh funding 
and given its interest in safeguarding its own resources, could have important ex-ante effects. 
It could reduce IMF’s incentives to lend before financial problems appear, as to guarantee 
space for providing capital when problems arise. Observed have argued, however, that the 
IMF tends to over lend previous to financial stress episodes at the cost of being forced to 
restrain from further lending when debt problems blow up. If this is actually the case, then the 
design we propose could, indeed, partly correct this situation.  
Another problem associated with the current framework is that the LIA policy 
basically ignores arrears to private domestic creditors. A first related problem is that, as 
mentioned above, in the current context of financial globalization, the dividing line between 
domestic and external debt is becoming increasingly blurred9. In addition, as a result of this 
bias in the LIA policy, the IMF may have devoted insufficient attention to the treatment of 
domestic creditors in sovereign debt restructurings. Our analysis suggests that an extensive 
involvement of domestic creditors could signal a “gambling for resurrection” strategy and may 
anticipate external solvency problems. As a result, focusing solely on external debt could 
delay the Fund’s intervention and exacerbate the cost of the crisis, especially if the early 
involvement of domestic creditors jeopardizes the future solvency of the domestic financial 
sector. Conversely, once the country has already defaulted, focusing the LIA policy on the 
restructuring of external debt may not be consistent with the objective of securing some 
degree of inter-creditor equity. Summing up, in its current form, the LIA policy does not take 
sufficiently into account sovereigns’ shifting incentives regarding the involvement of domestic 
vs. external creditors during a crisis. This may hamper the Fund’s potential to mitigate the 
impact of sovereign debt restructurings.   
A final question identified here is whether the scope of the LIA policy should be 
broadened to encompass the role of the IMF in all restructurings, and not only in those in 
which the sovereign has fallen into arrears with its private creditors. Various arguments could 
support such a broadening of the LIA policy. First of all, pre-emptive restructurings were often 
conducted under the threat of default should the debt exchange fail, which tended to blur the 
distinction with the post-default scenario10. Furthermore, our analysis has identified a number 
of potential dimensions of the Fund’s involvement in debt restructurings which could have 
applied both to our pre-emptive and to post-default cases. Indeed, the Fund’s advice on the 
best course of action to restore debt sustainability as well as its role as an adjustment agent 
and provider of information and incentives were equally relevant in both scenarios. In this 
context, it is arguable whether the presence of external arrears to private creditors has more 
of an economic justification as a trigger of a specific IMF policy than a pre-emptive broad-
based revision of the sovereign’s debt terms. 
 
                                                                           
9. A recent episode in Uruguay has illustrated the ambiguity associated with basing the LIA policy in this distinction 
between domestic and foreign creditors. In June 2004, a resident bank sold a US$2.3 million claim on the government 
to a non-resident. Because this equated to the emergence of arrears with external creditors, in June 2006 a case was 
made by the new owner of the claim that the LIA policy ought to have been activated, and that the IMF should press the 
Uruguayan authorities to negotiate in good faith to clear that arrear.  
10. A case in point was that of Uruguay, where the IMF made the completion of the third review of the program 
conditional to a high participation in the exchange. It was quite clear at that point that a suspension of the Fund’s 
financial support would have almost unavoidably resulted in a default. 
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Appendix 1: chronology of events 
 
Argentina
1999 2000 2002 2003 2004 2006 2007
t Q1 Q3 Q4
Restructuring
IMF involvement
Arrears to private external creditors
LIA policy formally applied
Jan'06: 
program 
cancelled
Mar' 00: 
SBA 
approved
Jan '03: 
transitory 
program
Sep '03: new 
3-year SBA 
approved
Non-
completion of 
SBA review
Sep'03: 
Dubai terms
Jun'04: 
Buenos Aires 
proposal
Jan'05    -    Apr'05
Jan & Sep: 
1st &2nd 
augmentation
   Aug '04: 
SBA 
suspended
Nov '01: Domestic 
debt exchange
Default:Dec 2001
2005
Q2
2001
 
 
 
Dominican Republic
2002 2003 2004 2007
t Q1 Q3 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Restructuring
Oct'05
April '04
IMF involvement
Arrears to private external creditors
All arrears cleared by Oct. '05
LIA policy formally applied
Exchange announcement: Dec'04
2005 2006
Jun '05 - Oct' 05Apr'05   
-        
May '05
Q2 Q4
April '06: 3rd & 4th review of the SBA and review under 
financing assurances completed
Aug '03: 
SBA 
approved 
Program 
off-track
Jan '05:    
New SBA 
approved 
IMF comfort 
letter
Reviews under the 2005 SBA included financing 
assurances reviews.  
            Debt exchange                     Program off-track or suspended         Paris Club agreement              London Club Agreement              IMF program        Other 
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Ecuador
1997 1998 1999 2002
t Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Restructuring
IMF involvement
Arrears to private external creditors
LIA policy formally applied
2001
Dec '01:end 
of SBA 
program
May '01: 
Arrears 
cleared
IMF comfort 
letter
   Exchange informally left 
open until Dec' 00
Apr '00, SBA 
approved
May'01: 
Program 
extension
Default: Sept. 1999
2000
July '00
Debt exchange              
officially closed in Aug '00
 
 
 
Pakistan 1997 1998 1999 2001 2002 2003
t Q3 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Restructuring
Jan ' 99 Jul '99 Jan. ' 01 Dec. ' 01
IMF involvement
Arrears to private external creditors
LIA policy formally applied
Nov '99-Dec '99
Nov '00: SBA 
approved
Dec '01:     
3-year PRGF 
approved
20001999
Exchange offer: May '99
Policy 
framework 
paper issued
Q4
IMF comfort 
letter
May '98: 
CCFF 
program 
July '99: 
program off-
track
 
        Debt exchange                     Program off-track or suspended         Paris Club agreement              London Club Agreement              IMF program        Other      
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Russia
1996 1999
Q1 t Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Restructuring
Aug'00
IMF involvement
Arrears to private external creditors
LIA policy formally applied
Jul'99
Default: Aug. 1998
Jul. ' 98;EFF 
augmentation
Program    
off-track Program expiration3-year EFF approved
Jul'99: SBA 
approved
Mar'99: 
novation 
scheme
Aug'99: Nov'99: New domestic 
debt exchange offer.
Aug '98: 1st failed 
restructuring offer
1998
Q3
2000
Jul '98 Pre-default 
GKOs swap
Q2
 
 
Serbia
1998 1999 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
t Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Restructuring
Nov '01 July '04
IMF involvement
Arrears to private external creditors
LIA policy formally applied
Default: Dec. 2000
2001
February '06: End of IMF 
support
Jun'01; SBA 
approved
May '02: EFF 
approved
 
         Debt exchange                       Program  off-track or suspended         Paris Club agreement              London Club Agreement              IMF program        Other    
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Ukraine
1997 2001
Q1 Q2 t Q4 Q1 Q2 Q4 Q3 Q4
Restructuring
Aug '99 July '01
IMF involvement
Arrears to private external creditors
LIA policy formally applied
Dec '00: program 
back on track
Feb '00 April'00Aug '98
Sep '98: 
EFF 
approved
May '99: program 
augmented
Aug '99: Program went 
off -track after the 3rd 
review
IMF comfort letter
1999 2000
Q3 Q3 Q1 Q2
3 SBAs approved in 
'95, '96, '97
Exchange Annoucement:Aug'98
1998
 
 
 
 
Uruguay
2000 2001 2002 t 2004 2005 2006 2007
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Restructuring
Apr'03-May'03
IMF involvement
Arrears to private external creditors
LIA policy formally applied
May '00:  2-
year SBA
Jun '06: Domestic arrear purchased by 
external investor
Nov '06: early cancellation 
of the program
Jun '06: Discussion on whether the LIA 
policy should apply
Exchange announcement:Mar '03
2003
Apr'02: 
SBA 
approved
IMF support to the 
Stabilization of the Banking 
System (LOLR)
Jun & Aug 
'02: SBA 
augmented
Jun '05:      
year SBA  
approved.
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Appendix 2: Key features of IMF-supported programs. 
Program type Approval Duration Amount  (% of quota) Comments
SBA Mar 00 3 years SDR 5.4 bn (255%) Focus on fiscal conditionality. Program failed.
1st 
augmentation
Jan 01 - SDR 5.2 bn (246%)
Relaxation of fiscal targets;reviews approved 
despite breaches in fiscal targets;support to 
the mega swap
2nd 
augmentation
Sep 01 - SDR 6.3 bn (300%)
Non-completion of the fifth 
review;disbursements suspended after default
Transitory 
program
Jan 03 7 months
SDR 2174.5 mn 
(103%)
Soft conditionality
SBA Sep 03 3 years SDR 8.9 bn (424%)
Soft conditionality; short-term orientation of 
fiscal targets;  suspended in August 2004
SBA Aug 03 2 year
SDR 437.8 mn 
(200%)
Program failure; only first review completed
SBA feb-05 28 months
SDR 437.8 mn 
(200%)
Successful implementation 
Ecuador
Ex post 
involvement
SBA April 00 1 year SDR 226.7 mn (75%) Successful implementation
Inherited 
programs
EFF-ESAF Oct 97 3 year SDR 1136 mn (110%) Program failed. Off-track in July 99.
SBA April 00 1 year
SDR 465mn (45% of 
quota)
Successful implementation 
PRGF Dec 01 3 years SDR 1033 mn (100%) Successful implementation 
EFF March 96 3 years SDR 6.9 bn (160%)
Weak implementation; targets relaxed in 
successive reviews
Augmentation Jul 98 - SDR 8.5 bll (143%)
Support to GKO swap. Program suspended 
after the parliament failed to approve a fiscal 
adjustment package.
Ex post 
involvement
SBA Jul 99 17 months SDR 3.3 bll (56%)
Only one purchase completed; program went 
off-track as a result of delays in structural 
reforms
SBA Jun 01 10 months SDR 200mn (43%)
Stepping stone for the Paris Club treatment. 
Successful implementation.
EFF May 02 3 years SDR 650mn (139%) Delays in the completion of the last reviews.
SBA Apr 96 9 months US$ 0.97 bll (71%) Successful implementation 
SBA Aug 97 12 months US$ 0.53 bll (37%)
Only partial disbursement as a result of 
breaches in macroeconomic conditionality.
EFF Sep 98 3 years US$ 2.2 bll (165%)
Augmentation May 99 - US$ 366 mll (20%)
SBA May 00 22 months SDR 150mn  (49%)
Originally precautionary. Resources eventually 
disbursed due to contagion from Argentina.
SBA Apr 02 2 years SDR 594mn (194%) Tighter conditionality. Succesful progress
1st 
augmentation
Jun 02 - SDR 1.16 bn (378%) Focus on the banking crisis.
2nd 
augmentation
Aug 02 - SDR 376 mn (123%)
3d review of the program made dependent on 
participation in the debt exchange.
SBA Jun 05 3 years
SDR 766,25mn     
(250%)
Satisfactory implementation.
Inherited 
programs
Dom. 
Republic
E
Inherited 
programs
Ex post 
involvement
Ex post 
involvement
Ex post 
involvement
Argentina
Serbia
Ukraine
Ex post 
involvement
Ex post 
involvement
Inherited 
programs
Pakistan
Russia
Explicit support to the restructuring. Difficult 
implementation: program went off-track 
various times and was only partially disbursed.
Inherited 
programs
Ex post 
involvement
Uruguay
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